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A European Law of New Health
Technologies?
Mark L Flear, Anne-Maree Farrell, Tamara K Hervey,
and Thérèse Murphy*
A. European Law and New Health Technologies
Setting out on this project, we asked ourselves: What—if any—are the deﬁning features
of European law approaches to new health technologies? What is the signiﬁcance
of European law to such technologies? To what extent and, if so, how is European
law on new health technologies legitimated? What are—and what should be—the
roles of markets, risk, rights, and ethics in that respect? Thus, our initial overarching
research agenda concerned the relationships between European law and new health
technologies.
In this chapter, we reﬂect on those relationships. In so doing, we ask a further
question: To what extent does our investigation deﬁne a new ﬁeld of scholarship—
European law of new health technologies? To sharpen our focus, we begin by reﬂecting
on our core concepts: ﬁrst, ‘new health technologies’ and thereafter ‘European law’.
1. New Health Technologies
What counts as a ‘new health technology’? We do not offer a new singular deﬁnition—
nor did we hope to do so. The concept seems to be insufﬁciently deﬁned for both
discursive practices (in varied contexts including academic, policymaking, and legisla-
tive) and effective regulation. This imprecision might well be quite deliberate and
pragmatic: the risk of running behind the pace of scientiﬁc, and social, development
gives both academics and policymakers good reason to eschew precise deﬁnitions.
But novelty is not necessarily a temporal phenomenon.1 ‘Old technology’ can become
‘new technology’ where new applications or new linkages make its use more controver-
sial.2 Researchers and medical practitioners differ in what counts as a ‘new’ health
technology.3 Intellectual property also drives claims of newness.4 Side effects, miscon-
duct, and accidents also have profound effects on what is ‘new’.5 Novelty can thus be
understood as almost entirely context-speciﬁc.
* Our thanks to David Fraser for an insightful peer review.
1 eg some ‘biotechnology medicines’, such as recombinant insulin, have been on the market in the
EU since the 1980s, see Chapter 2 in this collection.
2 eg new applications of in vitro fertilization, see T Murphy, ‘Repetition, Revolution, and Reson-
ance’ in T Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (OUP 2009). See also Chapter 15 in this
collection.
3 Chapter 4 in this collection.
4 Chapters 4 and 7 in this collection.
5 See eg A Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton UP 2002).
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What counts as ‘new’ may depend ultimately on human perceptions—what is seen
or constructed as new, socially not just scientiﬁcally.6 Thus, the visibility of techno-
logical developments may be more important than we imagine. Consumer, patient, or
public attitudes to new health technologies, including whether they are desirable or
undesirable, which feed into regulatory arrangements through democratic processes,
depend more on perceived novelty than intrinsic qualities of a new (health) technology.
Recognizing novelty as constructed explains why differences between perceived incre-
mental change and perceived radical change also matter: the former is perceived as
fundamentally less threatening, challenging, and risky than the latter.
Challenges of deﬁning ‘new health technology’ also reﬂect the well-known difﬁculties
in determining the meaning of ‘health’. Consider one of the widest deﬁnitions of health,
that of the World Health Organization (WHO), and contrast this with the deﬁnitions
found in the UNMillennium Declaration, or the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). The former declares that ‘the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human
bring without distinction of race, religion, political belief, or economic or social
condition’, and deﬁnes health as ‘a state of complete, physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or inﬁrmity’.7 The latter, by contrast, focus
upon those with the greatest health needs, for instance through the concept of ‘essential
medicines’, or treating medically recognized disabilities or illnesses.8
Finally, what counts as a ‘new health technology’? Going beyond medicines, medical
devices, and surgical procedures, such technologies encompass organizational systems
for health care provision, screening, technologies of health information, and ‘eHealth’.9
Even the simple technology of a book10 challenges our notion of ‘new health technol-
ogy’ and reminds us that novelty is not necessary instantiated in ways we might expect.
Our practical response to the deﬁnitional challenges was to leave the question of
what counts as a ‘new health technology’ to our contributors: they represent a
reasonably wide range of expertise. Reﬂecting on their approaches and choices, what
can we learn? First, by and large, our contributors excluded ‘green’ technologies,11
although of course these have important implications for (global) health. For example,
the ‘Green Revolution’ of the 1960s and 70s was supposed to alleviate hunger in the
global South;12 relationships between genetically modiﬁed crops and allergies are
6 Chapter 10 in this collection explores the concept of ‘newness’ in detail, drawing on the ﬁeld of
nanotechnology. On ‘social not just scientiﬁc’ see A Webster, Health, Technology and Society:
A Sociological Critique (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 171–5. See relatedly S Jasanoff, ‘Experiments
Without Borders: Biology in the Labs of Life’, BIOS Annual Lecture, LSE 15 June 2006 <http://
www.lse.ac.uk/bios> accessed 24 July 2012: ‘I think that British politics of science and technology
produces more dramatic pictures than America’s, and more of British politics happens, a result, in the
visual domain. . . . some of the best pictures that show what’s going on in the public domain are
produced [in the UK].’
7 Constitution of the WHO, 22 July 1946, 14 UNTS 185 (1948), preamble.
8 See further J Harrington and M Stuttaford (eds), Global Health and Human Rights (Routledge
2010); J Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (OUP 2012); B Toebes (ed), Health and
Human Rights in Europe (Intersentia 2012); B Toebes (ed), Health and Human Rights in Europe
(Intersentia 2012).
9 In the sense of technological support in health care practice, see the second Regulator’s perspec-
tive in Part II of this collection.
10 Chapter 15 in this collection.
11 cf Chapter 10 in this collection.
12 GS Khush, ‘Green Revolution: Preparing for the 21st Century’ (1999) 42 Genome 646;
K Mechlem and T Raney, ‘Agricultural Biotechnology and the Right to Food’ in F Francioni (ed),
Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (Hart 2007).
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insufﬁciently understood;13 bioremediation has important health implications.14 The
list could go on. Instead, the focus was primarily on ‘red’ technologies, which encom-
pass the design and application of biomedicine. This focus is perhaps understandable
given the use of such technologies to diagnose or alleviate (medically recognized) illness
or disability. In any case, it represents an initial and important way forward towards
considering the nature and scope of new health technologies, as well as offering an
opportunity to expand the research agenda through the inclusion of, and/or compari-
son with, ‘green’ technologies in the future.
Secondly, the phrase ‘new health technologies’ resonates on at least three different
levels.15 It denotes a small number of generic groupings of types of technologies (for
example, products, processes, or methods of using products). It can mean forms of
technology organized by scientiﬁc or technical sphere. Or it can mean speciﬁc examples
of these forms, with their applications. Our book offers a ‘map’ within which relation-
ships between these different levels can be explored.16
Thirdly, within the ﬁeld of ‘new health technologies’ we also ﬁnd many deﬁnitional
problems.17 Law did not produce all of these problems; it does perpetuate them,
however. For instance, European law distinguishes between pharmaceuticals/medicinal
products, medical devices, treatment protocols/processes/therapies, surveillance, and
diagnosis;18 between curative, prophylactic, enhancing, and cosmetic technologies;
between technologies for diagnosis, treatment, and monitoring; between pharmaco-
logical, immunological, or metabolic versus mechanical modes of action. Many of these
distinctions are unconvincing in the context of new health technologies. New health
technologies also overlap with categories generated by the interplay between science
and regulation,19 which have applications both within and outside health contexts.
New health technologies thus fundamentally challenge the internal logics of Europe’s
regulatory regimes (particularly those of the European Union (EU)).20 This challenge is
one of the reasons for our frame of inquiry.
But what are the implications of the deﬁnitional conundrums that are highlighted
here? First, regulatory authorities, forced to work within these deﬁnitional constraints,
may struggle or fail to keep pace with technological developments, leading to a constant
process of differentiation and adaptation through various mechanisms of governance to
maintain (a degree of) connection.21 Secondly, it can be unclear which regulatory regime
13 The Royal Society, ‘Genetic Modiﬁed Plants for Food Use and Human Health: An Update’
(Royal Society, Policy Document 4/02, 2002) <http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_
Content/policy/publications/2002/9960.pdf> accessed 18 July 2012.
14 Bioremediation involves the use of micro-organisms to remove marine pollution, see Chapter 4
in this collection.
15 As demonstrated by Chapter 4 in this collection in an analysis inspired by patent law.
16 Chapter 4 in this collection. In similar vein, drawing out the concept of ‘legal cartography’, see B
de S Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation (2nd edn,
Butterworths 2002).
17 Questions about deﬁnitions within the concept of ‘new health technology’ are picked up by
several of the chapters in this collection, eg: Chapters 5, 7, 8, 12, and 15.
18 Chapter 4, Section XX and Table 4.1.
19 Such as synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and biotechnology.
20 See eg the following from this collection: Chapters 4, 9, 10, 12, and 16.
21 See eg the following chapters in this collection: Chapters 9 and 12 and the ﬁrst Regulator’s
Perspective in Part II and the Regulator’s Perspective in Part III. On connection and new technologies,
see more generally R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008); R
Brownsword and M Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century (CUP 2012) 369–
420.
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applies, and due to the lack of clear legal deﬁnitions, undesirable regulatory gaps may
appear.22
Thirdly, in the context of supranational/multilevel governance environments, tech-
nical or scientiﬁc developments which bring newness to health technologies are accom-
panied by complexity and even confusion arising from deﬁnitional imprecision. The
problem of reaching consensus in European institutions (including science) makes
governance of change a difﬁcult task. It produces a resistance to unpicking what is agreed,
contributing to the accumulation of a legal and regulatory heritage, and a potential misﬁt
with new developments.23 This highlights a paradox of technological novelty, yet often a
response of governance continuity. There may be no easy solutions here except to allow
for purposive disconnection between new health technologies and their governance,
permitting the re-evaluation of deﬁnitional difﬁculties as and when they arise following
implementation and practice,24 and to adjust and reconnect accordingly.25
2. European Law
In our opening chapter, we deﬁned ‘European law’ as wider than the law of the EU,
encompassing the law of the Council of Europe, as well as that of organizations such as
the European Patent Ofﬁce, the OECD, and WHO Europe. Moreover, because these
overlapping legal orders reach into national legal orders in ways that belie hierarchical
relations, we also conceptualize European law as both multilevel and pluralist.26
Equally, we conceive ‘law’ as a much wider category than ‘legislation’ and ‘case law’,
with the legal institutions that develop it. ‘Law’ also includes within it ways in which
these ‘modes of governance’ (if that is the ‘meta-category’) interact with regulatory
strategies, including soft law such as technical guidelines, reporting obligations, and
benchmarking and indicators.27
Arguably, our focus on European law was too narrow. If health technology is a global
industry, why single out a European dimension? Perhaps our reference point should
have been global law—for instance, including the law of the International Conference
on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use, the WHO UNESCO, and the World Trade Organization? Should we
have discussed law from other jurisdictions, that is applied or avoided in European
contexts? And why European law? Should we have had ‘regulation’, or even ‘govern-
ance’ as our central focus? However broadly one draws ‘law’, it is difﬁcult to think of it
as the ‘meta-category’, particularly once we depart from the nation-state as the geo-
graphical reference point or scale.
22 As Chapter 12 in this collection notes for ‘combined products’; similarly Chapter 8 in this
collection points to the difﬁculties of deﬁning drug delivery through nanotechnology, or innovative
tissue engineering, in the terms of EU product liability law, which draws on the distinctions between
‘medicinal products’, ‘medical devices’, and ‘blood, organs, human tissue and cells’.
23 Chapters 10 and 12 in this collection.
24 Chapter 5 in this collection.
25 eg the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-316/09 MSD
Sharp & Dohme GmbH v Merckle GmbH 5 May 2011 nyr prompted the EU Commission to propose
amended legislation on information about prescription-only pharmaceuticals on the internet, see
COM(2012) 48 ﬁnal.
26 Several of our contributors report on the implications of European law in various national
contexts, see especially Chapters 5 and 8 in this collection.
27 Such as found in the EU’s ‘new governance’ approaches, see J Scott and DM Trubek, ‘Mind the
Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law
Journal 1; M Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (CUP 2011).
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But there are both practical and conceptual reasons for our focus. The practical
reasons were discussed in the opening chapter of the book. If one sees European law as a
multilevel pluralist legal system (and we do), the law of new health technologies in
Europe is European law. In the policy and (some) legal discourse, and crucially in the
discourses of the actors involved (regulators, industries, patients’ groups, and the like),
‘European’ has a meaning—or, more precisely, a range of meanings. These encompass
the different and arguably competing interests and aims of law and regulation—be they
ethical, scientiﬁc, commercial/market, socio-cultural—concerning new health tech-
nologies and the multi-valuing of humans, their bodies, human cells, blood, tissue,
and organs.28 As outlined later, these are often presented as calibrated and ‘in tune’, but
often essentially masking their (perhaps arguable) inherent incompatibility.
The conceptual reasons focus around heritage and, relatedly, imagined futures.
Europe is home to many technological ﬁrsts, including both Louise Brown, the ﬁrst
‘test-tube’ baby, and Dolly the sheep, the ﬁrst successful attempt at cloning a mammal
by means of nuclear transfer technology. It is the home, too, of legal experimentation.
Consider the EU: it is neither state nor international, instead ‘it stands between them,
incorporates strains of each and interlocks with them both’.29 The EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) is distinctive too. For instance, it establishes data
protection as an autonomous fundamental right, a move that makes it stand out
amongst human rights instruments which, by and large, hook data protection onto
the right to privacy.30 Or consider the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
praised as ‘the crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international system for
protecting civil and political liberties’31 and home to a body of case law that features
strongly in the common law of human rights32—that is, in the migration of human
rights ideas from one legal regime to another. And, just as interesting, in this common
law realm, the ECtHR is both exporter and importer.33
Overall, these related institutional forms ensure that Europe’s governance responses
do not develop from a ‘clean sheet’, but are conditioned by what went before. Of
course, this might generate both misﬁt between existing deﬁnitions or understandings
and new developments, and regulatory gaps. It also means that ‘European law’ holds
resources that can be refashioned and redeployed to ‘keep up’ and close any gaps, so as
to govern in the face of the uncertainty, ‘unknowing’, ‘cross-borderness’,34 and to shape
technoscientiﬁc developments and futures.
28 Chapter 9 in this collection, Section XX.
29 N Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’ in J Weiler and G de Búrca (eds), The Worlds of
European Constitutionalism (OUP 2011) xx.
30 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data Protection in the European Union:
The Role of National Data Protection Authorities (Publications Ofﬁce of the EU 2010) 6.
31 L Helfer, ‘Redesigning the ECHR: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the
European Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 125, 159.
32 See C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 499; C McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in E Örücü and D Nelken
(eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007).
33 See, respectively, Opuz v Turkey, App No 33401/02, Judgment of 9 June 2009 (wherein the
ECtHRmakes reference to communications of the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women), and Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003) (wherein the US SCt
makes reference to ECtHR case law).
34 A term coined by Zhang, Marris, and Rose to describe a key but neglected regulatory challenge in
the ﬁeld of synthetic biology: JY Zhang, C Morris, and N Rose, ‘The Transnational Governance of
Synthetic Biology: Scientiﬁc Uncertainty, Cross-borderness and the “Art” of Governance’ (2011)
BIOS Working Paper No 4.
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Indeed, Europe—encompassing European institutions, European governments, and
European publics—is also the home of a range of imagined new-health-technology
futures. These futures link in part to European pasts, actual (whether acknowledged or
neglected) and possible.35 They also link to the non-European: the EU, for instance,
endorses a precautionary approach that has led to it being brought before a Panel of the
WTO.36 The inﬂuence of the non-European might also grow in the future in that the
EU has been pitching itself as an actor in the international human rights ﬁeld. This
raises a host of interesting questions, including how going forward it can govern science
and technology so as to avoid giving ‘scientiﬁc’ endorsement to ideas of racial superior-
ity, and thereby give effect to the International Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination: in its Preamble the latter emphasizes that ‘any doctrine
of racial differentiation or superiority is scientiﬁcally false, morally condemnable,
socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justiﬁcation for racial discrimination
either in theory or in practice.’
Imagined futures, not surprisingly, draw heavily on markets. Individual European
states see themselves in a race to techno-innovate; the EU is also in this race, having
vowed to use scientiﬁc research to build the most competitive global-knowledge
economy.37 More speculatively, there may be distinctively European imaginaries
around other ideas that organize much of the thinking, in Europe and elsewhere, on
how new health technologies might be governed—ideas ranging from dignity to cross-
borderness, to what can and cannot be patented, and who should have a say in such
matters. Any such imaginaries will, of course, exert regulatory force, both in Europe
and outside it, and both aspirationally and aversively (or, as some prefer to say, by
means of ‘policy learning’).
In terms of why ‘law’ (rather than, say, governance), law remains an important part
of the governance environment for new health technologies in Europe. Part of the
reason is the way law engages with novelty. For instance, in the EU context, the
European Medicines Agency’s Road Map; or horizon scanning, through EuroScan on
health technology assessment, stress the novelty of the science, rather than its continu-
ity.38 The ECtHR addresses the scientiﬁc and social novelty of new health technolo-
gies, which it represents as not only new,39 but rapidly developing. This justiﬁes the
need to develop appropriate legal responses, which also includes anticipating develop-
ments in knowledge that could not be foreseen at the time of adjudication.40 In both of
these contexts there are some notable attempts to respond to novelty through new legal
or regulatory ideas or institutions. Take, for instance, the rise of public bioethics: in
the EU, through the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
(EGE) and ethics committees; and in respect of the Council of Europe, the Oviedo
35 See eg G de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105
American Journal of International Law 649; B Prainsack and R Gmeiner, ‘Clean Soil and Common
Ground: The Biopolitics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Austria’ (2008) 17 Science as
Culture 377, examining the impact of the past on Austria’s stance on reproductive medicine.
36 EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Reports WT/
DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS292/R, 29 September 2006.
37 See eg Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions, 23–24 March 2000 <http:www.
europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1.en.htm#a> accessed 16 July 2012; European Commission, ‘Europe
2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’ COM(2010) 2020 ﬁnal.
38 Chapter 4 in this collection.
39 Of course, the technology at issue in SH and Others was not so new; as the applicants contended,
it was ‘common and readily available’, and ‘reliable’.
40 Chapter 13 in this collection.
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Convention41 and the ECtHR’s use of ‘emerging consensus’ in respect of new health
technologies.42
Yet, in other examples, and arguably the dominant picture overall, existing legal ideas
(rights, dignity, liabilities, authorization, etc.) and ‘regulatory heritage’43 (path depend-
ency) are used to deal with what is at the same time presented as novel. For example, in
the Council of Europe context, these might constitute ‘ﬁxed reference points’.44 EU
product liability law treats new health technologies in the same way as any other
product. In fact, it strengthens the legal ﬁction that a comparative product is any
other product in its ‘development risks defence’, which protects producers from liability
for defects that could not be discovered at the time the product is put into circulation.45
New health technologies, such as nanotechnology, are deemed insufﬁciently new to
warrant new regulatory responses.46 This reversion to pre-existing regulatory insti-
tutions, tools, and techniques, in an approach that can be described at best as
‘incremental regulatory innovation’47 is ‘arguably the most pronounced feature of the
EU’s regulatory response to nanotechnology’.48 So, in some important respects, Euro-
pean law of new health technologies not only is not so new itself, but also paradoxically
quite often does not conceive of new health technologies as ‘really new’. This domin-
ance of legal continuity is therefore the reason for our focus on law.
Moreover, given the increasing attention paid to ‘hybridity’ and blurred boundaries
between different forms of law,49 between law and regulation, and in seeking optimal
‘governance blends’, we do of course need to think in terms of law’s place—of how it
does, and how it should, relate to other modes of governance.50 But in so doing we
must not lose sight of law. To guard against that risk, there needs to be attention to the
particular—not just particular ﬁelds of law (intellectual property, crime, human rights)
but also to particular legal and non-legal settings where the governance of new health
technologies is determined or resisted. Our view is that law’s part—including the part
played by European law—in the governance of new health technologies is shaped by at
least two forces. It is shaped, ﬁrst, by the ways in which legal and non-legal forms of
governance (ethics, for instance) are seen by legal actors and institutions. Secondly, it is
shaped by the ways these different forms of governance are seen by non-legal and
hybrid institutions and actors.51
There is one ﬁnal, deﬁnitional point: Why European law and new health
technologies?
41 Chapter 3 in this collection.
42 Chapter 13 in this collection.
43 Chapter 10 in this collection.
44 Chapter 3 in this collection.
45 Chapter 8 in this collection.
46 Chapter 10 and 12 in this collection.
47 Chapter 12 in this collection, 15.
48 Chapter 10 in this collection Section XX.
49 See eg Chapter 2 in this collection; F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private
Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 20; G de Búrca and J Scott, ‘Introduction: New
Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in
the EU and US (Hart 2006); G de Búrca, ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction’
(2010) Wisconsin Law Review 227.
50 The ﬁrst Regulator’s Perspective in Part II of this collection. See also SHE Harmon, G Laurie,
and F Arzuaga, ‘Foresighting Futures: Law, New Technologies, and the Challenges of Regulating for
Uncertainty’ (2012) 4 Law, Innovation and Technology 1.
51 See further Chapter 13 in this collection; the various Regulators’ Perspectives in this collection.
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Why not, for example, European law and new technologies? Or European law and
health? Or even European law and rights in health contexts? There are interesting
questions here of classiﬁcation and its consequences. There are also, we accept, existing
strands of scholarship focused on each of these possible, alternative ﬁelds. This book,
we think, contributes to those existing bodies of literature. But it also claims to do—or
at least to attempt—more. It asks: Is there a distinctive ‘European-ness’ to the
relationships between European law and new health technologies? And so we turn to
our second main section of this chapter—to the deﬁning features of European law
approaches to new health technologies where we consider whether there is a European
law of new health technologies.
B. Deﬁning Features of European Law Approaches
to New Health Technologies
Our inquiry began with the intuition that, if there is a European law of new health
technologies, it is typiﬁed by a certain ‘European-ness’ in terms of four features:
markets, risk, human rights, and ethics. The four frames are demonstrably overlapping
and, in general, mutually supporting. This phenomenon presents us with some
organizational difﬁculties in the text that follows. Rather than break up the ﬂow of
our discussion, or attempt to present an exhaustive coverage of all possible combin-
ations of the four frames, we begin by considering each frame alone, before turning to
examine some of the more pertinent combinations.
1. Four Frames
a. Markets
One (perhaps the) traditional economics view of the role of markets as a mode of
governance is that markets promote free trade, which fosters efﬁciency. The role of law
and other governance mechanisms is to ‘hold the ring’ for rational economic actors
within a free market, and to correct for market asymmetries.52 In other words, law or
regulation is ‘second best’ to markets.53 As examined in various chapters in this book,
the relationship between markets, law, and regulation in the context of European law of
new health technologies is more complex and nuanced than that account.
In the context of the EU, the market is the dominant frame for law on new health
technologies.54 Almost every area of the relevant EU law, especially its legislation, and
the regulatory institutions and practices that surround it, refers to the market as its
rationale. These references range from access of new products or services to the EU
market; to regulation of research with a view to eventual marketing to protection of
consumers (patients) once a new health technology is on the market. Even legislation
that appears to have a stronger rationale than that of the market55 is framed as being
52 Such as informational asymmetries which might impede such rational behaviour.
53 See T Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise (OUP 2010) 2, drawing on one of the seminal works in
the law and economics ﬁeld of regulation: A Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart
2004).
54 Chapter 2 in this collection.
55 eg the EU’s Directive on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, which in many ways
concerns the ethics of allowing patent protection on controversial inventions, eg those involving
embryonic stem cells.
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centrally concerned with the market.56 The entire structure of EU regulation of new
health technologies, the way the regulatory measures ﬁt together, cross-refer to each
other, and are justiﬁed, all concern the marketing of new health technologies. At a level
of generality (though not at every aspect of the regulatory landscape), the EU’s
approach to risk, rights, and ethics is essentially all about the need to create, foster,
and protect the EU’s market.
Law and its supporting institutions are therefore used by the EU to facilitate market
arrangements with respect to new health technologies. These legal concepts and insti-
tutions include (a) ‘services’ in health care; (b) the notion of ‘product’, especially ‘safe
product’, for instance as applied to new health technologies that also involve parts of the
human body; and (c) the institution of the ‘competent authority’, a trans-European
requirement that presents itself as ensuring market parity for various actors within the
context of development, production, and use of new health technologies.
Relevant EU regulation refers to the EU’s ‘internal market’, and the perceived need
for removal of barriers to trade within it, so as to optimize growth and economic
opportunity for inventors, developers, producers, and distributors of new health
technologies operating within the EU. Equally, patients have used the EU law focus
on the internal market to escape perceived deﬁciencies in the regulatory environments
in their home state. Likewise, Member States have used the ‘safety valve’ of availability
of treatment abroad to sustain their regulatory choices in the face of local criticism.57 In
this assessment, the market rationale of EU law of new health technologies is legitimate.
Pluralist arrangements whereby different countries may have different rules, but may
not impede consumer (patient) access to markets in other countries, increases consumer
(patient) choice and ‘exit’ from sub-optimal national regulatory arrangements.
By contrast, prizing a legally harmonized single EU market more highly than
consumer rights has negative effects for consumers in countries where, for instance,
prior to harmonization, product liability laws gave greater protection to consumers.
The ‘freezing’ of EU law in time is also sub-optimal, as the law can fail to keep pace
with technological developments.58 The underlying rationale of EU legislation, to the
effect that there is a single (albeit regulated) EU market in all products, is also ﬂawed.
The market for new health technologies is not a normal consumer-led market: the main
‘consumers’ are national health systems, and they do not behave like normal con-
sumers—their decision-making is signiﬁcantly more politically constrained. Similarly,
‘slight deviations in domestic implementation’ can be interpreted as leading to too
much heterogeneity for optimal regulation, in terms of creating the space necessary for
innovation to be translated into clinical or health care settings.59
Moreover, the binary division in European law between ‘products’ (which are the
subject of ‘ordinary’market trade, though may be regulated heavily if safety or quality is
at issue) and ‘the human body’ (which is not, in European contexts, to be traded) is
tested to destruction by the emergence of certain new health technologies.60 The ways
56 As strikingly seen in the Brüstle case in which the CJEU differed from the opinion of its AG to
articulate a market-based rationale, rather than one based on dignity.
57 eg Austria bars ova and sperm donation for IVF but recognizes the parental status of those who
have gone abroad for treatment: see Chapter 13 in this collection. See also T Hervey, ‘Buy Baby: The
European Union and Regulation of Human Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
207.
58 Chapter 9, Sections XX in this collection, 9, 11.
59 This argument is implicit in Chapter 5, Section XX in this collection.
60 Such as collagen scaffolds, for instance the decelluralized homograft valve being developed in
Hannover’s regenerative medicine research cluster: see Chapter 5 in this collection.
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in which that binary division has infused the EU’s legislative and regulatory structures
for new health technologies (including the ways in which they are implemented in
national contexts) not only provide opportunities for both a regulatory ‘race to the top’
as well as a ‘race to the bottom’, but can also be seen as nothing short of ‘a manifestation
of injustice’.61 A comparison with the US approach highlights the deﬁciencies of the
European law of this aspect of new health technologies. The implication is that, as a
knowledge-based economy, the EU is not well served by the law. Of course, beyond the
nation-state, law’s reach is limited, as it represents the outcome of often intense political
bargaining in a complex multilevel governance environment, with all of its messiness,
deﬁciencies, and necessary silences or omissions designed to assuage political conﬂict.
EU law also refers to the place of the EU’s new health technology industries within
the globalmarket, and the desirability of designing the EU’s governance structures so as
to optimize the ability of EU ﬁrms to compete there.62 The ways in which individuals
seek to escape or avoid governance arrangements within Europe that are perceived as
sub-optimal are part of the way in which the global market frames European govern-
ance. A ‘level playing ﬁeld’ is legitimated by pursuit of European industry’s competi-
tiveness in global markets. In addition, it could be argued that the EU uses its approach
to governance in the ﬁeld of health technologies as a way of positioning itself as a
leading global actor in the ﬁeld, by exporting its legal style to the global stage.63
Finally, in terms of the market frame, we note that new health technologies do not
emerge fully formed de novo on the market, ready to be regulated, and only then become
subject to law. Rather, law shapes the conditions for the emergence of new health
technologies, their eventual constitution, and concrete manifestations and effects. As
several of the chapters show, the market for new health technologies is created—through
discourses of hope and expectation, promulgated by clinicians, patients, regulatory
agencies, and health authorities.
b. Risk
The case studies of new health technologies in this book show that, in European
contexts, it is not contested that a range of governance mechanisms is necessary to
regulate risk. Furthermore, European law conceptualized as ‘command and control’ or
as ‘legislate and adjudicate’ will capture only a small part of the story—hence our focus
on law, whilst at the same time taking account of regulation and wider social norms.
The assessment and management of risk in the context of uncertainty and the
legitimacy of risk-management institutions and regulatory structures resonates particu-
larly in European contexts in relation to emerging new health technologies.64 The
legitimacy of EU governance of new health technologies may be assessed by reference to
procedural or constitutional institutional standards; democratic standards;65 functional
or effectiveness standards; or value-based standards, depending on the objectives of the
regulatory regime.66 This latter conceptualization resonates strongly with risk-based
standards of assessing the EU’s regulatory regime for new health technologies, as the
61 Chapter 5, Section XX in this collection.
62 Chapter 12, Sections XX in this collection.
63 For an example of the EU’s approach in this regard in the case of environmental policy, see RD
Kelemen, ‘Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public
Policy 335.
64 Nanotechnology being the prime contemporary example here.
65 Such as participation, transparency, deliberation, accountability.
66 Chapter 9 in this collection.
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expressed values of the EU’s relevant legislation place ‘consumer’ or even ‘patient’ safety
centre frame. In terms of effectiveness, the EU’s regulatory strategies can be seen to be
deﬁcient, in that they tend to lock regulatory responses into established analytical
frameworks, rather than being open to ‘variation and evolution over time and between
contexts’,67 lacking comprehensiveness and leaving regulatory gaps, and revealing
deﬁciencies in regulatory capacity.68 Effective EU governance of new health technolo-
gies needs to move beyond the ‘risk as safety’ frame, to conceptualize risk as a social and
cultural construct, shaped by public perceptions and ethical concerns.69
In addition to the problems created by such a narrow construction of risk, the
structures of EU law70 also operate in practice to privilege relationships between
regulators and the pharmaceutical industry, to the detriment of clinical investigators.71
Implicit in this analysis is that EU law (as part of the global regulation of pharmaceut-
icals) is woefully inadequate to protect patients against risk. Moreover, the legal threat
of enforcing contractual provisions with respect to conﬁdentiality at least affects the
timing of release of information about clinical trials to the scientiﬁc community and/or
regulatory authorities, and may operate to intimidate some researchers into silence. Far
from protecting patients against risk, in this account the ‘dark side’ of the law is
instrumentalized to protect a powerful industry, which has integrated itself with both
regulatory authorities and research institutions (universities) alike.72
As implied earlier, risk in EU law on new health technologies is normally conceptual-
ized as patient, or even consumer, safety. However, this is not always the case. Risks
faced by industries with respect to regulatory uncertainty and sub-optimality also
feature fairly strongly in the relevant legal and policy instruments. The calculation of
risk varies as between expert and non-expert views.73 There is a tendency in the EU to
focus almost exclusively on expert calculations of risk, and this is a key part of the
‘regulatory heritage’ of new health technologies in that context.74 Equally, in EU law,
the policy and regulatory debate is said to follow a peculiarly narrow trajectory focused
around risk.75 This ‘European’ approach to risk, which has been characterized as
essentially protectionist, may be contrasted with the US approach, which is said to
view risk as opportunity.76
The EU’s reliance upon risk regulation of new health technologies as a means of
legitimation77 can be seen through considering three main factors:78 the ‘ﬁt’ of risk as
67 Chapter 10 in this collection.
68 Chapter 12 in this collection.
69 Chapter 9 in this collection.
70 In particular, the narrow notion of locus standi in judicial review claims before the CJEU.
71 Chapter 11 in this collection.
72 Chapter 11 in this collection.
73 Chapter 8 in this collection.
74 Chapter 10 in this collection, using examples from nanotechnology.
75 Chapter 10 in this collection.
76 There is a diversity of views on point. Eg it has also been argued that the difference between the
EU and the USA is one of process (EU) versus product (USA) in relation to risk assessment: see S
Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in the United States and Europe (Princeton UP
2005) 83. See further JB Wiener, MD Rogers, JK Hammitt, and PH Sand, The Reality of Precaution:
Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe (RFF Press 2011); D Vogel, The Politics of
Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States
(Princeton UP 2012).
77 Chapter 10’ analysis in this collection of European Parliamentary discourse around nanotech-
nology; Chapter 9’s, analysis in this collection of management of risks to public health from new health
technologies.
78 Chapter 9 in this collection.
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deﬁned by EU regulation with risk and ethics’ concerns of relevant actors; the
‘immanent critique’ of whether regulation meets its stated aims; and the procedural
arrangements for facilitating transparency and evaluation of the regulatory regime. The
EU continues to make claims that its regulation of risk enhances public trust, even
where assessing risk to consumers, patients, or the public within standard epistemol-
ogies is fundamentally challenged by the novelty of health technologies.79 Moreover,
far from opening up debate through legal requirements of transparency and account-
ability, in the context of a powerful global pharmaceutical industry, European law can
be used to close down contestation, and to narrow the debate among medical experts
and other relevant stakeholders.80
So far, we have considered, of course, only one element of European law of new health
technologies: EU law. One inquiry suggested that the Council of Europe does not
feature in the (standalone) market frame: however, as regards the risk frame, we would
argue that it is present as ‘rights as risk’.81By this wemean the potential for human rights
to operate as a risk when failure to comply with rights or otherwise meet the requisite
standards undermines institutional or organizational reputation and standing. Human
rights, in other words, are an ‘institutional risk’ that must be managed. But the
imbalance in coverage needs to be addressed further, and to do so we turn now to the
third of our legitimating frames: human rights. The law of the Council of the Europe
and the law of the EU are present here. We also ﬁnd both domestic and international
human rights law, as well as a range of rights- and anti-rights activism (some of which
might link to what science and technology studies (STS) describes as ‘biocitizenship’).82
c. Human rights
Generally, human rights operate as a kind of bridge between theoretical and emotional
grounds for action—and from there to the fundamentally practical. Put differently,
there is a strong empowering and instrumental dimension to human rights; they provide
a form of attention to the world that underpins action that might disrupt or shape
trajectories in innovation, through concrete techniques and practices, especially law.
Indeed, this might be part of the reason why some have asked if they will replace (bio)
ethics in the governance of the life sciences and related technologies.83
Human rights, on the face of it, are an important dimension of European law of new
health technologies. There is no shortage of legal rules (albeit some of them are on the
‘softer’ end of the rule-spectrum): most notably, there is the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), and
both the European Social Charter and the Oviedo Convention, as well as rights
protections (including direct incorporation of the ECHR) in the legal frameworks of
individual European states. More than this, rights-based approaches to the regulation of
new health technologies have been recommended by advisory groups such as the EGE.84
The EU, given both the commitment to seek accession to the ECHR and the status of
79 Such as nanotechnology, see Chapter 10 in this collection.
80 Chapter 11 in this collection.
81 Chapter 17 in this collection. On ‘rights as risk’ and ‘risk within rights’, see more generally
T Murphy, Health and Human Rights (Hart 2013 forthcoming) ch 4.
82 Chapter 13 in this collection.
83 Chapter 14 in this collection; Chapter 13 in this collection.
84 See eg G Hermerén, ‘Accountability, Democracy, and Ethics Committees’ (2009) 2 Law,
Innovation and Technology 153; House of Commons Committee on Science and Technology,
‘Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law’ HC 7, 2004–2005.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2012, SPi
400 Flear, Farrell, Hervey, and Murphy
Comp. by: PG2689 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001797202 Date:12/12/12 Time:12:59:31
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001797202.3D401
the EUCFR, also seems to be signalling its own human rights intentions, perhaps a more
coherent human rights policy than previously.85 And, the ECtHR, for its part, seems
alert both to the need for substantive rights protections and to the ways that human
rights encourage, or even mandate, certain principles of governance.86 It is also alert to
new technologies as a threat to human rights, and to the ways that new ‘techno-enabled’
rights could threaten the balancing of rights and interests mandated by, for instance,
Article 8 ECHR.87
There is, however, a counter-story. As regards health, it could be said that EU law has
been less about human rights and more about rights to information, to provide services,
and to avail of such services.88 More generally, the European Economic Community at
its inception may well have been more human rights-robust than today’s EU.89 The
lack of cases on new health technologies before the ECtHR is, of course, another reason
to doubt the centrality of human rights law to European law of new health technolo-
gies. Relatedly, the ECtHR usually provides a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ to
contracting states when it considers that there is no European consensus, ‘either as to
the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it,
particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues.’90
Still, there is a direction of movement in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR towards
increasing scrutiny of national policies in contexts where health technologies are
developing.91 More importantly, in terms of European law of new health technolo-
gies—speciﬁcally, in terms of human rights having not just a role in the governance of
new health technologies but a role that could be said to be distinctively European—the
margin of appreciation doctrine92 seems to be central. We say this for two reasons.
First, this doctrine is an ongoing experiment in the negotiation of a core human rights
question and, relatedly, of European identity: namely, how to achieve a balance
between universalism and particularism? Secondly, the doctrine signals the productive
nature of European law: the ECtHR does not simply reﬂect consensus, but can also be
seen to play a signiﬁcant role in creating the consensus.93 In similar vein, as we discuss
later, because the ECtHR sees human rights as having a procedural dimension, rights
may also shape what is expected both when European law of new health technologies is
‘in the making’ and when that law aims to be ‘future proof ’.94
Attention to human rights also highlights how the European law of new health
technologies is pluralist—but with a minimum core. This is apparent in, for example,
the notion of margin of appreciation and in strong variations in terms of national
interpretations of EU law at the stage of implementation of EU Directives.95 New
85 The call for greater coherence was made, eg, in ‘Leading By Example: A Human Rights Agenda
for the European Union for the Year 2000’.
86 Chapter 3 in this collection.
87 See respectively S and Marper v United Kingdom [GC] (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at para 71, 112;
Odièvre v France [GC] (2003) 38 EHRR 871.
88 Chapter 6 in this collection; Chapter 17 in this collection. See further TK Hervey and JV
McHale, European Union Health Law (CUP 2014 forthcoming).
89 As Gráinne de Búrca has argued (n 35).
90 Evans v United Kingdom [GC] (2008) 46 EHRR 34, para 77.
91 Examples include gender reassignment surgery, and the relatively strong steer given to contract-
ing states, as well as strong dissenting opinions, in cases concerning ARTs. See Chapters 3 and 13 in
this collection.
92 Chapter 3, Section C and Chpater 13 in this collection.
93 Chapter 3, Section C and Chpater 13 in this collection.
94 See text at nn 105 and 159. See more generally Chapters 3 and 13 in this collection.
95 Chapters 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 17 in this collection.
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health technologie, as many have noted, raise issues of deep and reasonable disagree-
ment: constitutional pluralism is how Europe manages these disagreements, and both
constitutes itself as a distinct order in the global system and projects itself within it by
offering examples of governance approaches to new health technologies.
Within the general framework of pluralism, we discern a ‘minimum core’ of non-
negotiable substantive European law of new health technologies. Emanating from the
Council of Europe, and implicit in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, this minimum core
focuses around human rights (mainly ‘civil and political’ rights, but also to some extent
economic and social rights)—in particular, rights related to autonomy or privacy,96 as
well as to some extent equality and the right to health.97 In EU law, the non-negotiable
focuses on the right to privacy and related rights. Thus, human rights in the European
law of new health technologies are not inﬁnitely malleable. This minimum core of
European law of new health technologies may include implications such as obligations
to ensure adequate information is given to users of new health technologies on
the beneﬁts and risks of their use; to help and protect people (the young, the very
old, those who lack capacity) who are unable to make their own health care decisions;
to ensure quality and safety of new health technologies for the public in general; and to
ensure that new health technologies do not increase existing social inequalities. Such
obligations ﬂow from extant standards within the Council of Europe; most of them are
also reﬂected in EU law.98
We also discern an increasingly accepted notion of a minimum core of procedural
and institutional European law of new health technologies. European human rights law
prescribes which interests have to be considered, promoted, and balanced in whatever
regulatory framework is adopted (at national or transnational levels) and, to an
increasing extent, the institutional arrangements through which these processes must
take place. Although the substantive balance of these interests is contextually variable,
the procedural requirement to consider relevant interests is non-negotiable. In the
discourse,99 this minimum core includes strong notions of transparency, thereby
facilitating broad public debates which are said to legitimate law and regulation of
new health technologies. So, for instance, the ECtHR accepts stronger differences in
approach, through the legal doctrine of the margin of appreciation, where there is
evidence of wide public deliberation on the new health technology at issue. Indeed, for
the ECtHR, ‘good’ European law of new health technologies is regularly reviewed and
revised, taking into account not only developments in science, but also those in
society.100 In the EU context, the notion of a ‘competent authority’, with obligations
to report to the EU’s institutions, used in the harmonization strategies of the EU in
many of its legislative instruments, imposes a non-negotiable institutional obligation on
Member States, even if the details of operation of national ‘competent authorities’ vary
signiﬁcantly.101
Finally, notions of the ‘human’ in human rights are likewise salient to European law
of new health technologies. Generally, although not discussed directly in this collection
96 The consent principle, respect for private and family life.
97 The ‘minimum core’ identiﬁed in Chapter 3, Section XX in this collection.
98 With the possible exception of the last, although EU law does recognize the principle of
inequality, and is committed to promoting ‘health for all’ in many of its policies, see European
Commssion Communication on Solidarity in Health: Reducing Health Inequalities in the EU, COM
(2009) 567 ﬁnal.
99 Though would be difﬁcult to defend the idea that this has been realized in practice.
100 Chapter 13, Section XX in this collection.
101 See Chapters 9 and 10 in this collection.
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in, say, discussions touching on the embryo in European law102 (or so-called ‘post-
humans’103), this salience is apparent in relation to, for instance, the question of the
rights holder and who has rights protections in the ﬁeld of xenotransplantation.104 In
the EU the human holds rights, and the non-human is subject to weak welfare
considerations, but is largely effaced from law. This process of the sequestration of
the ‘creaturely’ in EU governance of new health technologies is, perhaps unsurprisingly,
related to its speciﬁc concerns, especially around safety, and by implication its focus on
markets, that is, ensuring consumption of products. By contrast, however, the Council
of Europe, recognizes the unprecedented transpecies-hybridity of xenotechnologies and
the need for more robust protections for the non-human. Overall, however, the non-
human is largely ‘rubbed out’ of European law. Nevertheless, in this way the meaning
of ‘human’ in human rights is highlighted in European law of new health technologies,
raising the question: Are human rights themselves future proof? Of course, European
law of new health technologies relies not only on human rights, but also on other non-
market frames, such as ethics, to which we now turn.
d. Ethics
What about ethics, the ﬁnal frame in our quartet? One point stands out: ethics, for a
range of reasons, is hard to pin down. This seems true as a general claim; it is also true in
the context that concerns us—European law of new health technologies. Why is this
so? First, ethics has not been a dominant feature of the European policy landscape.105
True, ethics has been a strong frame in EU research funding regulation106 and in the
use of human biological materials107 and the ECtHR does grant a wider margin of
appreciation where there is no European consensus, ‘particularly where the case raises
sensitive moral and ethical issues’.108 However, none of these developments places
ethics as a central inﬂuence on policy or on law. There is also a tendency, prevalent
across the European law and policy landscape, to make references to ELSI (ethical,
legal, and social implications), to ‘ethics and rights’ or ‘law and ethics’, or to ‘sensitive
moral or ethical issues’. These relentless linkages do not help when the question is:
What is the role of ethics in European law of new health technologies?
Secondly, if we accept that European law is, or could be, inﬂuenced by the emerging
international governance framework on new health technologies,109 we face a further
problem: the ‘bioethical triangle’.110 Human rights are a point of departure in the
international framework, but they do not stand alone—rather, they are one part of an
ethical plurality, sharing the regulatory terrain with both a dignitarian ethic and a
102 Itself implicated in several chapters, eg Chapters 2 and 13 in this collection.
103 I Karpin, ‘The Uncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human and Reproduction Without
Women’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 599.
104 Chapter 16 in this collection.
105 Chapters 2, 3, and 14 in this collection.
106 See further the Regulator’s Perspective in Part IV of this collection.
107 See Chapters 5 and 9 in this collection.
108 Evans (n 90).
109 See in particular the UN Declaration on Human Cloning 2005 and UNESCO’s clutch of
international biotechnology instruments: the UDBHR 2005, the International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data 2003, and the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997.
110 See eg R Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern
Biotechnologies’ in Murphy (n 2).
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utilitarian one.111 Occasionally, the plurality will converge around a consensus: more
often, however, ‘choices will have to be made’.112
So-called ‘regulatory ethics’ adds to the difﬁculty. Even if we look only at medical
ethics and bioethics, casting these as two forms of ethics that exert regulatory inﬂuence
in Europe, we are faced with a range that includes academic, clinical or professional,
corporate, and public bioethics. Each of these contributes to the governance of new
health technologies and to what is, and what is not, seen as within (European) law’s
reach. For instance, to avoid the legal risk of rights, and other legal and non-legal risks,
science and technology companies may work on ‘ethical prophylaxis’;113 in other words,
on ﬁnding ways to protect their technologies by means of their own ‘good practice’.
Academic bioethics, in the wake of the 2005 UNESCO Declaration on Bioeth-
ics and Human Rights, has spent time investigating not just the tensions within
that Declaration but also two far broader questions: namely, could human rights
subsume bioethics, and should it?114 Human rights lawyers—in Europe and
elsewhere—have shown no particular interest in those questions or in the analyses
being offered by bioethicists. Dignity has drawn their attention,115 and the Oviedo
Convention has sparked interest too, but outside these developments there is little
of note.116 The ECtHR, for its part, has been less than encouraging: giving advice
on Recommendation Rec(2003) 10 of the Committee of Ministers concerning
xenotransplantation, representatives of the Court suggested that the ECHR ‘should
be understood as a legal instrument aimed at securing individual rights and as such
it may be of limited relevance to policy issues in the ﬁeld of bioethics.’117 So is the
ethics frame a sideshow or even an irrelevance in European law of new health
technologies?
The answer is that ethics is neither a sideshow nor irrelevant: in what follows we
explain why. Let’s start with public bioethics—whether that be the EGE or an ethics
advisory group in a particular European state.118 For us, this is a particularly interesting
regulatory force. Our decision to include a set of regulators’ perspectives testiﬁes to our
interest: several of these regulators serve, or have served, on bodies that are engaged in
111 See eg Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), Art 2(d).
112 H Somsen, ‘Regulating Human Genetics in a Neo-Genetic Era’ in Murphy (n 2); see the notion
of ‘ethical subsidiarity’ in Chapter 16 in this collection.
113 The phrase comes from S Franklin, ‘Ethical Biocapital’ in S Franklin and M Lock (eds),
Remaking Life & Death: Toward an Anthropology of the Biosciences (SAR Press 2003). She notes that
ethical concerns are increasingly being ‘built into’ new life forms, as eg, in the development of a stem
cell extraction procedure which removes one cell from the blastocyst without impinging on its ability
for further development.
114 See eg Chapter 14 in this collection, and RE Ashcroft, ‘The Troubled Relationship Between
Human Rights and Bioethics’ in MDA Freeman (ed), Law and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues, vol 11
(OUP 2008).
115 See eg C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008)
19 European Journal of International Law 655; T Murphy, ‘Taking Revolutions Seriously: Rights, Risk
and New Technologies’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 15.
116 Doing human rights ‘ethically’ is an emergent theme (see eg T Murphy, ‘Public Health Sans
Frontières: Human Rights NGOs and “Stewardship on a Global Scale” ’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland
Legal Quarterly 659) but this has not translated into increased interest in rights, ethics, and new health
technologies.
117 Draft Memorandum to Recommendation Rec(2003)10 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Xenotransplantation—Explanatory Memorandum. 5 June 2003, CM(2002) 132
Addendum, at Appendix <http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id = 45827> accessed 18 July 2012. Cf
‘Research Report: Bioethics and the Case-law of the Court’ (Council of Europe/European Court of
Human Rights, 2012) <http://www.echr.coe.int> (Case-law–Case-Law Analysis–Research Reports).
118 The UK’s Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics being one illustration.
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public bioethics.119 What we cannot do, however, is specify the nature or the extent of
the regulatory force that is being exerted by this form of ethics. Equally, we cannot say
whether it has a distinctive ‘European-ness’ to it. Hence, our proposal for work
diagnosing why, policy-wise, bioethics has been the ‘go to’ discipline for contributory
expertise (rather than say law or, within that, human rights law). We also called for
work that examines how individual advisory groups treat legal knowledge and, indeed,
legal experts where they form part of the membership.120
Work of this sort is important because it will bring to light whether and how public
bioethics expresses and fosters European (and not just EU) citizenship or, what STS
calls, ‘biological citizenship’ (and the related matter of who—or what—is excluded or
largely effaced, that is, the non-human).121 It will also help us to dissect claims that
public bioethics plays another, rather different role—of providing a focus for expert-
generated discourse, which produces and legitimates an expert-led EU regulatory
environment that supports innovation.122 Finally, it should help us to answer the
interesting question of whether there is a European bioethics and allows us to discern
the reach, content, and meaning of that bioethics.123
For now the answer we give to the question of whether there is a Europena
bioethics is ‘no’ (or at least not yet). Any claim that the precautionary principle
constitutes such a European bioethic can be dismissed because as yet, even in the
apparently advanced engagement by the EU, this principle has neither an agreed
meaning nor a commonly accepted normative force.124 In similar vein, if we look at
Council of European law, any claim focusing on dignity as the core European
bioethics also needs to be dismissed or, at all events, put on hold.125 Obviously, for
some, the place of dignity in the EUCFR is grounds for optimism.126 And, looking
ahead to an EU that has acceded to the ECHR, we may imagine an enhanced role for
the dignity, focused Oviedo Convention.127
However, in tension with this notion of a European law of new health technologies
founded on a European bioethic of dignity, we see the EU as a framework within which
ethical differences are managed, in the pursuit of the ‘prize’ of creating and sustaining
the internal market, and a sufﬁciently globally competitive industry.128 The ethics of
actually providing patient access to new health technologies129 are not the subject of
European law.130 Perhaps this should not surprise us: ethical questions are a ‘national
matter’ in EU contexts, and the ECtHR sees the lack of a European consensus,
‘particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues’, as one of the triggers
119 See the Regulator’s Perspectives in Parts I, II, III and IV of this collection.
120 For these proposals, see Chapter 13 in this collection.
121 Chapter 16 in this collection.
122 Chapters 2 and 16 in this collection.
123 This question is posed in Chapter 14 in this collection.
124 See the discussion in Chapter 14 in this collection. For a developing argument on the principle’s
role in a rights-based community, see Brownsword (n 21) and Brownsword and Goodwin (n 21).
125 Chapter 3 in this collection.
126 Chapter 9 in this collection.
127 Chapter 14 in this collection.
128 Chapters 2 and 6 in this collection; Syrett in this collection.
129 Say, to members of vulnerable groups such as those suffering rare diseases.
130 Save, perhaps, emergent Council of Europe law on the ‘right to health’ combined with the
principle of equality; and, perhaps, the emergent governance processes in the EU’s promotion of
exchange of information between national health technology assessment agencies: see, respectively,
Chapters 3 and 2 in this collection.
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for a wide margin of appreciation.131 In any event, if we are seeking a European
bioethic, as a central frame or feature of today’s European law of new health technolo-
gies, both precaution and dignity fall short of the mark.
Still, the EU’s ‘ethical market’—an idea developed in a number of chapters—seems
an interesting offshoot of the question about a European bioethic. Might it be an entity
that is at once distinctly European and distinctly ethical? And by drawing in the
European Patent Convention, with its reference to morality,132 could we broaden
this ethical market beyond an EU-identity? Could we also draw in the Council of
Europe and, in so doing, introduce the idea of a human rights-based market? The
potential is there. On the other hand, there are grounds to be doubtful. The EU
successfully navigated signiﬁcant differences over the ethical dimensions involved in the
donation of blood, human tissue and cells, and organs. To do so, the EU invoked
the authority of the Council of Europe in matters concerning ethics and human rights.
The reality of the market (particularly in blood) in Europe was almost entirely
suppressed in the text of the relevant legislation.133 We would do well to be sceptical
over whether this market-suppressing approach contributes to the effective manage-
ment of risk, especially in clinical settings. Likewise, EU law on gamete donation asserts
that it is based on an ethic of altruism, ignoring the very real market in gametes (both
for infertility treatment and for stem cell research) and the different positionings of
women and men, and of different women, in this market.134
In summary, then, although we have shown that the place and roles of ethics in our
new ﬁeld of inquiry—European law of new health technologies—are important, for
now we cannot do much more than raise some of the questions as to why this is so and
point to importance of following up this frame.
2. Frames in Combination
a. Markets and . . .
In general,135 EU law of new health technologies conceives the need to protect against
risks as fundamentally linked to the market frame. The need to safeguard patients,
consumers, or public health from undesirable outcomes, in the context of uncertainty,
is justiﬁed by the need to create and sustain markets in those new health technologies.
We see this in the range of EU law on new health technologies, including product
safety and product liability legislation. This legitimation of European law of new health
technologies is found strongly in EU law, but also seems to be associated with
other legal orders, such as the World Health Organization (WHO),136 although it is
not represented in Council of Europe law.
Our case studies show that, in general, markets and risk reinforce one another in EU
law in two closely related ways—either a risk narrative supports the market frame, or the
risk narrative is embedded within the market frame. Areas such as EU law on research
131 See, respectively, Chapters 2, 13, and Z in this collection.
132 Odell-West in this collection.
133 Chapter 7 in this collection.
134 Chapter 17 in this collection.
135 Although we note here that we were unable to agree whether this holds true for EU law on the
human body and new health technologies; further investigation would be necessary to resolve this
difference of opinion.
136 Chapters 2, n 102 in this collection.
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funding, research processes, intellectual property, and product safety are all examples of
these connections between markets and risk. The constant reference point in these areas
of EU law is the aim of getting new products or services to market, in such a way that
consumers will have conﬁdence in their quality and safety.137 The legitimacy of
regulatory management of uncertainties and risks entailed in new health technologies
is assessed by reference to the ways that it supports the EU’s market in new health
technologies.
Having said that, a more nuanced approach is required if we are to understand the
interrelationship between risk and markets in the context of European law regarding
the collection and supply of human biological materials, whether in their raw form or as
part of tissue engineered products. Running strongly through European social thought
is the need to avoid the instrumentalization or commodiﬁcation of the human body.
This has become embedded not only in key (bio)ethical texts and declarations, but also
in rights-based legal instruments such as the EUCFR and the Council of Europe’s
Oviedo Convention. So how can this be squared with the commercial value that is now
ascribed to such materials in the wake of scientiﬁc and technological advances?
Reliance has been placed on the ill-deﬁned notion of human dignity to exclude the
commodiﬁcation of, as well as trade in, such materials.138 This is at odds with the
reality of a thriving and lucrative European and, indeed, global market in human
biological materials, such as blood and various types of tissue. These high-level (‘consti-
tutional’) legal instruments may be read as one way in which the EU seeks to reconcile
the relationship between risk and markets in this context. At the level of legislation,
however, the EU does not fully acknowledge the dimensions of the market in the
context of the design of the EU-wide blood regulatory regime for blood, for example.
This failure has adverse implications not only for facilitating effective risk governance in
the context of market activity, but also for broader questions concerning regulatory
legitimacy.139
In terms of legitimation, here we also see the idea that the EU’s market itself
embodies or embeds a particular approach to risk management, and that the EU’s
market is constructed as one which is safe for consumers/patients.140 Risk and market
are also deployed to construct the EU as a democratic order. Risk operates in support of
the market, which is therefore kept working, but at the same time also provides a way of
making the EU capable of being audited and inspected as it relates to its citizens and
broader publics. The risk/market narrative thus plays a key role in legitimating EU
regulation.
The Council of Europe’s approach to both risk and markets is more difﬁcult to
unravel. The ECtHR’s approach to the ‘right to health’ may be seen as incorporating a
‘precautionary’ approach to risk, especially in the context of environmental threats to
health, but also carried over into contexts concerning the right to information about an
individual’s health (such as results of genetic testing).141 In general, both markets and
risk, and the market/risk nexus are much less visible in Council of Europe governance
than in the EU context. Indeed, in SH and Others v Austria the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR, upholding Austria’s ban on third party donation for IVF, mentions the
137 eg products must be tested in ways that ensure minimization of risks to consumers when they
reach markets.
138 Chapter 3 in this collection.
139 Chapter 9 in this collection.
140 Chapters 2 and 9 in this collection.
141 Chapter 3, Section XX in this collection.
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opportunity for Austrians to travel abroad for treatment and have their parental status
recognized at home, yet it makes no mention of any of the risks that attach to cross-
border reproductive care.142 So, if we are serious about a European (and not simply a
European Union) law of new health technologies, we probably cannot characterize that
law as constructed entirely through market-based legitimation of risk regulation.
To summarize, European law of new health technologies works to articulate the
notion that the European market in new health technologies is safer, more respectful of
human rights, and more ethical, than other markets. European law of new health
technologies is thus constructed as the polar opposite of a ‘global Vegas’, where more or
less ‘anything goes’. European institutions have to grapple with a balance between, on
the one hand, a totalizing discourse which pushes ‘European’ standards towards higher
standards (a position associated with the European North and West), so that no one
can ‘escape’, and a notion of European diversity and pluralism, or even regulatory
competition (a position associated with the European East and South), which enhances
choice (for those who can move within Europe).143 Choice itself, as a core manifest-
ation of autonomy in the human rights and ethics frames discussed later, is thus a
legitimating factor in European law of new health technologies.
The apparent primacy of the market in the European context might be disrupted, for
example, by the EUCFR and its relation to the ECHR. If the EUCFR represents how
the EU characterizes and formulates governance (with respect to new health technolo-
gies), by reference to human rights, in terms of its immanent, self-proclaimed values,
this if demonstrated would represent a fundamental change to the EU’s self-representa-
tion as understood here. The implications of that discourse include that the EU is not a
market organization, or not just a market organization, with its regulatory activities
legitimated by reference to the efﬁciency of markets. Rather, the EU would be laying
claim to the legitimating elements of human rights, and resonating with the heritage
of the Council of Europe, to justify its regulatory activities. But while this discourse
is discernible at the level of abstract legal instruments (such as the EUCFR), it
disappears almost entirely when the frame or scale of reference144 changes to the detail
of legislation or regulatory norms.
b. Human rights and ethics
Earlier we mentioned ‘ELSI’—ethical, legal, and social implications of new health
technologies. We were unable to tease out the relationships between the individual
components; doing so is, we think, an important ongoing task—one that calls not for
grand diagnoses but for close, careful studies of legal and non-legal sites where decisions
are made about what is ethical, what is legal, the links between them,145 and so on.
Imagine, however, that it is not ELSI but rather ‘ethics and human rights’, a combin-
ation of two of our four frames, which needs to be dissected. Is this more straightfor-
ward? Maybe, but it is not by much.
One challenge is that human rights manifest as law and as discourse.146 ‘Ethics
and human rights’ will have different meanings depending on whether one reads
142 Chapter 13 in this collection.
143 Chapter 17 in this collection.
144 Da Sousa Santos (n 16).
145 R Brownsword, ‘Bioethics: Bridging from Morality to Law’ in Freeman (n 114).
146 Chapters 2, 13 and 17 in this collection.
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‘human rights’ to mean law, discourse, or both. And where the combination changes to
‘ethics and rights’, other possibilities—consumer rights, rights for non-humans147—
will emerge.
Both the recent and the more distant past produce challenges too. Some may tell a
story of the birth of human rights and bioethics in the Nuremberg Trials, and of
overlapping or shared experiences subsequently (notably around the rise of informed
consent), thus claiming a ‘European-ness’ to human rights and ethics as a feature of
European law of new health technologies. Yet origin stories are always controversial
and others will downplay, or even dismiss, these overlaps between human rights and
bioethics.
The recent past, too, is unlikely to produce consensus on the relationship between
ethics and rights. It has, to be sure, been a time of internationalization and institutional-
ization: there has been almost a ‘race to the top’ for ethics and human rights, both
separately and in tandem. One instance of the latter is the 2005 UNESCO
UDBHR.148 Another is the rise of an ‘almost unquestionable presumption’ that it is
best for children to know about the gamete donor(s) who played a role in their
conception.149 This presumption draws both from the ethical notion of ‘best interests’
and from the human rights commitment to respect for private life150 (and, in places,
from the impropriety of state-supported deception151). A third illustration is provided
by EU orphan medicines legislation.152 The aim of this legislation is to entitle patients
suffering from rare conditions to the same quality of treatment as other patients,
which we may see as ‘equity’ and ‘non-abandonment’ (a notion reﬂected in the very
term ‘orphan’), meaning a combination of an ethic of solidarity (which is embedded
in European health care systems) and the right to equal treatment.
Turning to the EU’s general approach to regulating new health technologies,153 we
may be more explicit again. In general, ethics and (human) rights in this context can be
melded, as their roles in EU regulation of new health technologies are similar. We
particularly note ‘an ethics or (human) rights-based approach to markets’ in three areas:
ﬁrst, research funding and intellectual property rights promoting research; secondly,
safety in research processes and products; and, thirdly, consent in research processes.
Of course, even if the overall conclusion is that rights and ethics are used ‘more as a
means of legitimating other framing choices than as a frame in themselves’,154 this too
is a melding of rights and ethics.
But ‘in tandem’ is not the only, or even the dominant, mode for ethics and human
rights. The UDBHR—a universal declaration on bioethics and human rights—has
already attracted a wide range of criticism.155 Meanwhile, as noted earlier, European
law (both the law of the EU and that of the Council of Europe) has effaced the animal
(and with it the ethic of animal welfare), placing humans (with their human rights)
in the centre of its frame.156 There has also been concern at the ‘demoralisation of
147 Chapter 16 in this collection.
148 Chapter 14 in this collection.
149 Chapter 17 in this collection.
150 It is not clear if the ECtHR would back this ‘right to know’ to the exclusion of competing rights
and interests: see eg Odièvre v France (n 87).
151 Discussing the United Kingdom, see J McCandless, ‘The Changing Form of Birth Registra-
tion?’ in F Ebtehaj and others (eds), Birth Rites and Rights (Hart 2011).
152 Chapter 6 in this collection.
153 Chapter 2 in this collection.
154 Chapter 2 in this collection, x.
155 Chapter 14 in this collection.
156 Chapter 16 in this collection.
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medicine’—a trend attributted in part to the manner in which rights-based systems can
corrode trust in professionals and in professional ethics, and potentially pitch law
against ethics in damaging ways.157
Imagined futures, too, offer different prognoses on the rights/ethics relationship in
European law of new health technologies. For instance, does human rights, because of
its capacity for empowerment, have an edge over bioethics?158 Is it, in other words, seen
as more ‘future proof?’We could, of course, imagine a developing normative framework
for European governance of biomedicine, and the institutionalization of a human rights
approach, through a transposition of the Oviedo Convention from its rather minor role
as a persuasive authority in the interpretation of the ECHR, to a rather more important
role as a guiding set of principles for the governance of biomedicine within the EU.159
Yet inquiry not imagination is what is required. The best prescription, therefore, has
to be close study of the relevenace of the interactions (or not) of ethics and human
rights (as law and as discourse) in both legal and non-legal sites where the governance of
new health technologies is determined or, indeed, resisted.160 In this way we might
begin to understand the relationships between these modes of governance and, of
course, whether there is a certain European-ness to any of them, standing alone or in
combination.
C. Agendas Going Forward
So, in light of our ﬁndings, we move now to reﬂect on agendas for future research.
Much supranational governance has been focused on the promotion of trade and
international markets. While this may not be a problem in some areas, it is in the
case of technologies that have the potential to impact upon human health and well-
being. Legal and regulatory responses to technologies beyond the nation-state at the
supranational level present persistent problems for legitimacy and legitimation, and
law’s role in this regard is likely to be vital. The contributions to this book have made a
start in addressing these problems, simply because health matters, it is political, and it
affects citizens directly.
More speciﬁcally, in the foregoing discussion of the deﬁning features of European
law of new health technologies, credibility, trust, and accountability are raised, and the
roles of markets, risk, human rights, and ethics in promoting those have been discussed.
In this context of the four frames as legitimating devices, we might typify markets as
preoccupied with efﬁciency; risk as preoccupied with safety; human rights as preoccu-
pied with freedom and dignity; and ethics as preoccupied with freedom, dignity,
justice, and ‘fundamental morality’. Understood thus, these four legitimating frames
claim (mostly) mutual separation. For instance, the regulatory legitimacy which follows
from efﬁciency is mutually inconsistent with that which follows from safety, freedom
and dignity, or justice, and so on. We might say, then, that European law of new health
157 J Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185. He does
accept, however, that rights—notably ECHR rights—have, within them, a capacity to ‘remoralise’
medicine.
158 Ashcroft (n 114).
159 Arguing against the ‘cynical story’ about bioethics, the international human rights movement,
and the UDBHR, see TA Faunce and H Nasu, ‘Normative Foundations of Technology Transfer and
Transnational Beneﬁt Principles in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights (2009) 34(3) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 296.
160 Chapter 13 in this collection.
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technologies has very disparate and even contradictory claims to legitimacy. This
requires further study.
Further, several of the chapters consider the extent to which the aspects of European
law upon which they focus are legitimate, deﬁned in various ways, including by
reference to effectiveness, to fairness or equality, to democracy or accountability.
Their ﬁndings suggest, in general and overall, that both political and institutional
legitimacy with respect to the use of (new) health technologies is a salient issue and at
the same time is problematic for supranational polities, such as those occupying the
European space. Traditional methods of achieving legitimacy may not be possible at
supranational level, given the existence of non-majoritarian institutions and decision-
making processes.161 As such, techniques of legitimation become important. We have
focused on the use of law (broadly deﬁned) as a key legitimation technique in various
guises. But further attention is required to tease these out, begging at least one question:
In what areas are new legal techniques in need of development, what shape should they
take, and what values should they seek to uphold?
Moreover, in asking what the roles of markets, risk, human rights, and ethics are in
the legitimation of European law on new health technologies, we are also asking a
question of a different order. We are interested not so much in the legitimacy of
European law’s approach in terms of its outcomes, but more in how these ideas are used
as ways of legitimating regulatory purposes and practices—and, indeed, of legitimating
ideas of ‘Europe’ itself. Overall, then, there is a need to examine both legitimacy and
legitimation in greater depth.
Secondly, we need to explore further the promise and the pitfalls (for legal modes of
governance, for legal method, and more broadly for the governance of new health
technologies) of particular ways of seeing law. The ECtHR, as we have seen, has faith in
law—technologies may be fast-moving, they may even be a threat to human rights but
law can, does, and should, move in ways that are a match for this. For the ECtHR,
then, law is not fundamentally unsuited for the challenges posed by new health
technologies. Yet this notion of faith in law is strongly challenged in the ‘empirical
realist’ account of two of the sociologists who contributed to this collection: for them
the law, far from being benign or protective of dignity and freedom, is an instrument of
already powerful actors, and thus perpetuates (undesirable) relationships that are
fundamentally unequal.162 The upshot is that both faith in law and no faith in law
merit further study, as do the range of positions in-between.
As part of this might be asked: Is there something speciﬁc to European law that could
justify faith in it—or a leap of faith? In particular, how does—or could—that law deal
with the future, with degrees of uncertainty, and with the scope for unknowing (in a
scientiﬁc sense) inherent to new health technologies in Europe’s context of intense
internal cross-borderness? How is this to be described? In the context of European law’s
ongoing experiment inmelding universalism and particularism, via doctrines such as the
margin of appreciation, the notion of ‘European consensus’, the doctrine of subsidiarity,
or locally crafted compliance with generally framed obligations as in the case of EU
Directives, does this amount to a new way of thinking about—and doing—law?
A third area for further exploration concerns relationships between law, new health
technologies, and identity. In ongoing processes, European institutions essentially seek
to construct an identity that is distinct as compared to other (global) regulators. For
161 A notable exception being the European Parliament.
162 Chapter 11 in this collection.
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example, the EU’s projection of its identity as a supranational order founded on the rule
of law (as framed and legitimated around markets) is used to underpin a process of
knowledge production leading to application in material objects, such as new health
technologies. In addition, this collection offers a few glimpses into the complex,
interacting, and mutually constitutive techniques, practices, and processes of the
‘making up’ of both individual and collective identity in relation to European law.
For instance, even as state practices often remain distinct,163 European law and its
constitutive features of markets, ethics, risk, and rights, work with technoscience,
(biomedical) knowledge, and imagined futures to provide a basis for individual and
collective identiﬁcation, ‘European-ness’, or European biocitizenship. This can be seen
in the ways that ‘other’ hospitals, research centres, products, and technoscientiﬁc
processes are increasingly being used, consumed, and thought of as not so foreign.
These offer multiple means of identiﬁcation: European citizens, European consumers,
and now European patients. The permutations of these, as well as who is included—
Europeans and non-Europeans who are affected by European law?—and law’s roles in
fabricating identities, such as through instantiations of imagined technoscientiﬁc
futures, are ripe for further exploration.
There is scope for consideration of whether and, if so, to what extent, and which,
Europeans (and even non-Europeans) are enrolled in European law (or not). What are
the rationales for their involvement? That is, to what extent is citizen or public
participation truly an effort to mobilize and facilitate substantive involvement in
European law, and to direct and shape the material outputs of new health technologies?
Are such efforts, for instance in the ﬁeld of synthetic biology, merely attempts at
legitimating governance that regulate and seek to calm citizen discontent and contest-
ation?164 How are biocitizens making use of traditional legal sites and fora (such as
courts) in order to demand and contest decision-making over new health technologies
and life itself?165What newer or alternative legal sites and fora are being used—or might
be needed—in order to facilitate involvement?Who is included and who is marginalized
and silenced and even excluded in attempts to demand and contest decision-making?
Moreover, identities change: theWHO estimates that by 2020 depression will be the
second largest cause of morbidity worldwide.166 For this and other reasons, the neuro-
sciences now command considerable attention—from states and from others too.167
What new European biocitizens—and non-European biocitizens—might emerge from
this increasing centrality of neurology and mental health care? Do ECtHR judgments
on the rights of mental patients, and the associated rights-activist tradition within some
European states, notably the United Kingdom, give Europe a degree of legal prepared-
ness? Or are these ‘old’ rights ill-suited to emergent science, illness, and patient activism?
And, more than this, are rights—or at least rights as law—entirely the wrong frame?168
163 Chapter 17 in this collection.
164 ML Flear, ‘The EU’s Biopolitical Governance of Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products’
(2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 113; ML Flear and MD Pickersgill,
‘Regulatory or Regulating Publics? The European Union’s Regulation of Emerging Health Technolo-
gies and Citizen Participation’ (2013) xx Medical Law Review xx).
165 A potential and practice highlighted in at least a couple of contributions, eg NGO interveners at
Strasbourg in Chapter 13 in this collection; identity issues identiﬁed by Chapter 17, Section XX in this
collection.
166 See <www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/deﬁnition/en/>.
167 See further J Abi-Rached and N Rose, Neuro (Princeton UP 2012 forthcoming).
168 For views, see N Rose, ‘Unreasonable Rights: Mental Illness and the Limits of the Law’ (1985)
12 Journal of Law and Society 199; LO Gostin, ‘From a Civil Libertarian to a Sanitarian’ (2007) 34
Journal of Law and Society 594. On ECtHR case law, see P Bartlett, O Lewis, and O Thorold, Mental
Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2006).
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Fourthly, there is scope for more comparative scholarship. Ultimately, a claim to the
effect that a ‘European law of new health technologies’ is distinctive would be more
convincing in the context of comparison to other governance systems.169 We would like
to know, for instance, is there a ‘law of the Americas of new health technologies’, or an
‘Asian lawof newhealth technologies’? There is also scope for amore thorough comparison
of European law of new health technologies with the emerging international framework.
A ﬁnal question is that of the redistributive consequences of European law of new
health technologies. The frame of law170 which we have adopted in this book, and the
focus on the European level, in themselves diverted us from a thorough consideration
of the redistributive consequences of what we have explored here. Some of our
contributors do consider questions of redistribution—who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
in European law of new health technologies?171 But there is much more work to be
done here to unravel what it means for redistribution, which in the current pluralist
European constitutional settlement is a matter for national or sub-national govern-
ments and governance processes—although the Eurozone bailout deals are already
having a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on European health systems.172 It is unimaginable that
the contexts within which that redistribution must take place remain unaffected by
European law of new health technologies. But what are the implications?
Related questions are about regulation through control of resources173 and, crucially,
about relationships between redistribution, ethics, and human rights. If the EU wishes
to be recognized as a global human rights actor,174 and if the ECtHR wants to live up to
the claim that it is ‘the jewel in the crown of the world’s most advanced international
system for protecting civil and political liberties’,175 each needs to think carefully about
the right to enjoy the beneﬁts of scientiﬁc progress and its applications,176 about the
obligation of international cooperation and assistance, and relatedly, about how a
human rights conception of intellectual property might differ from existing ways of
promoting innovation and creativity. International human rights law and practice, as
well as developing states and a range of NGOs and INGOs, are engaging with these
questions.177 Scholars, too, are interested.178
Yet the EU, like the USA, has been pursuing bilateral agreements, known as TRIPs-
plus, seeking to avoid TRIPs ﬂexibilities that allow states to use public health needs to
invoke compulsory licensing. The ECtHR for its part has had little to say on crossing
169 But note Theodore Marmor’s warning against unthinking comparison of health systems, see
T Marmor, RB Freeman, and K Okma, ‘Comparative Perspectives and Policy Learning in the World
of Health Care’ (2005) 7 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 331.
170 Though in its broader governance contexts.
171 Chapters 6, 11, 13, and 17 in this collection.
172 N Fahy, ‘Who is Shaping the Future of European Health Systems?’ (2012) 344 British Medical
Journal 1712.
173 What Daintith calls ‘government by dominium’: see T Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Govern-
ment’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (OUP 1994) 209.
174 See eg G de Búrca, ‘The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35
European Law Review 174.
175 Helfer (n 31).
176 See eg International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), Art 15(1)(b).
177 See eg Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Beneﬁts of Scientiﬁc Progress and Its
Applications 2009 <http://shr.aaas.org/article15/Reference.Materials/VeniceStatementJuly2009.pdf>
accessed 16 July 2012; ‘The Right to Enjoy the Beneﬁts of Scientiﬁc Progress and Its Applications’:
Report of Farida Shaheed, Special Rapporteur on cultural rights, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May
2012).
178 See eg T Pogge and others (eds), Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to
Essential Medicines (CUP 2010); M Sunder, From Goods To A Good Life: Intellectual Property and
Global Justice (Yale UP 2012).
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borders for health purposes—whether Europeans crossing borders to other European
states or further aﬁeld, or seriously ill non-Europeans being returned to their countries
of origin.179 All of these phenomena have serious redistributional consequences. They
also limit the prospects of European law of new health technologies as an experiment
in ethical or human rights-based markets. That observation concludes our main
candidates for future directions, and it brings us to our ﬁnal question.
D. Conclusion
Where are we, at the end of our project? Our overall argument runs something like this.
Together, the detailed analyses within this book demonstrate that, taking a broad-
brush, high-level view, there is sufﬁcient cohesion around the legitimating factors of
markets, risk, human rights, and ethics, alone and in various combinations, to justify
our claim to have created a new ﬁeld of scholarship: European law of new health
technologies. Our ‘map’ of that new legal ﬁeld sets out its broad parameters, identiﬁes
its key features, and establishes an agenda for both research and reform into the future.
We are not claiming that European law of new health technologies is a unitary or
uniﬁed legal system—rather, it is a pluralist network of legal sites, focused around a
legitimating process of determining ‘European-ness’. This is not a surprise, as Europe’s
identity is (and probably always will be) a process, and the institutional and legal
instantiations of ‘Europe’ (the Council of Europe, the EU, and so on) relate to and
co-construct the very notion of what it is to be ‘European’. One of the tantalizing
features of that ‘European-ness’ is the promise of escape from the globalizing force of
market power. For sure, markets are writ large in the legitimation of European law of
new health technologies. But they do not tell the whole story. And that is why
European law of new health technologies represents a perfect case study for reﬂecting
on power, democracy, legitimacy, global justice, and redistribution: some of the most
salient issues in our fast changing world.
179 On the latter see the ECtHR judgments in D v United Kingdom and N v United Kingdom,
discussed in Chapter 3 in this collection.
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